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CONFEDERACY LAND CLAIMS 
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 In 1790, President George Washington promised that the United States 
would shield the Six Nations Confederacy against New York State’s 
relentless efforts to take its lands.
1
 He assured the leaders of the Six Nations 
that federal law would protect them and that the federal courts would 
remedy any wrongdoing by the State.
2
 In the two hundred years since the 
President made this solemn commitment, however, the Six Nations have 
suffered dispossession and dislocation on a massive scale, and, despite 
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 1. Modern historians trace the formation of the Six Nations Confederacy to sometime 
between 1450 and 1600, when the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca 
Nations came together. BARBARA GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
14 (1972). The Tuscarora Nation joined the Confederacy in 1722. See ANTHONY F.C. 
WALLACE, TUSCARORA: A HISTORY 2 (2012). The Six Nations Confederacy refer to 
themselves as Haudenosaunee. See Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 732 F.2d 
261 (2d Cir. 1984) (granting Haudenosaunee, or the Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy, 
intervention in land claims asserted by the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin). The member 
nations of the Six Nations Confederacy owned and occupied by aboriginal right and treaty 
guarantee most of New York State before the founding of the United States. 
 2. In response to Six Nations’ complaints that they had been defrauded of their lands, 
President Washington pointed to the recently enacted Trade and Intercourse Act as “the 
security for the remainder of your lands” and promised that 
[t]he general Government will never consent to your being defrauded—But it 
will protect you in all your just rights. 
 . . . . 
 If, however you should have any just cause of complaint against [land 
speculators], and can make satisfactory proof thereof, the federal Courts will be 
open to you for redress, as to all other persons. 
Letter from George Washington to the Seneca Chiefs (Dec. 29, 1790), in 7 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 146 (Jack D. Warren, Jr. ed., 1998). 
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steadfast efforts over many decades, have yet to secure any protection from 
the Executive Branch or adequate remedy from the federal courts.  
The question of whether and how President Washington’s promise will 
be fulfilled remains a defining issue in relations between the Six Nations 
and the United States. Recent court developments suggest that fulfillment 
of Washington’s promise may elude this generation, as it has many 
generations past. In a series of rulings beginning in 2005 with City of 
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,
3
 the federal courts have closed the 
courthouse doors to Indian claims deemed to disrupt the “settled 
expectations” of non-Indian landowners, even when it is beyond dispute 
that Indian land was taken in violation of federal law and when Indians seek 
only money damages from the New York State government.
4
  
The courts’ conclusion that equitable considerations should be applied to 
deny remedies to Indian nations required an intentional disregard of several 
centuries of history. In City of Sherrill, the Court relied on an incomplete 
and one-sided historical record to find that the Oneida Nation had 
inexcusably delayed asserting its jurisdiction over the parcels of land taxed 
by the City.
5
 The historical record was necessarily spotty because the Court 
announced the new equitable defense without first affording the Oneida 
Nation an opportunity to develop and present its historic efforts to assert its 
sovereignty over the area.
6
 
                                                                                                             
 3. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).  
 4. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 
1128 (2006) (reversing $248 million judgment on basis of City of Sherrill); Oneida Indian 
Nation v. Cty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 970 (2011); 
Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 419 
(2013); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, 628 F. App’x 54 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2512 (2016); Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, 756 F.3d 163 (2d 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015). 
 5. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221. The Court announced a new equitable defense 
that appears to apply only to Indian nations. The Court drew on the doctrines of laches, 
acquiescence, and impossibility to conclude that the Oneidas’ assertion of jurisdiction over 
lands they lost in 1805 and only recently acquired through purchase on the real estate market 
was “inequitable” and therefore barred. 
 6. The Questions Presented for Review in the Petition for Certiorari were limited to the 
following: 1) whether the Oneida Reservation is Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and 
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); 2) whether the 
subject land was Indian Country in light of the fact that the reservation was established by a 
treaty with New York State, rather than a federal treaty; 3) whether the 1838 Buffalo Creek 
Treaty disestablished the Oneidas’ New York reservation; and 4) whether the Oneida 
Reservation may remain Indian Country if the tribe claiming such status has ceased to exist. 
Brief for Petitioner at 1, City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197 (No. 03-855), 2004 WL 1835364, at 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/2
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Scholarly criticism of the Court’s misuse of history may undermine the 
legitimacy of City of Sherrill and perhaps even limit its application.
7
 But 
the untold story of the Six Nations Confederacy’s efforts to assert their land 
rights and jurisdiction is relevant for other reasons, including the Nations’ 
ongoing efforts to obtain a remedy for the loss of their lands.  
It remains unknown whether the equitable defenses announced in City of 
Sherrill are a detour or a dead end on the Six Nations’ road to achieving 
justice for the loss of their lands. There can be no doubt that the leaders of 
the Six Nations are committed to obtaining redress for this dispossession. In 
the face of these court decisions, obtaining relief for the Six Nations will 
likely require renewed focus on the political branches, particularly 
Congress. 
Careful review of the historical record demonstrates that courts denying 
land claims made by the Six Nations fundamentally misconstrue two key 
facts: first, for nearly two centuries, Indian nations could not access state or 
federal courts to vindicate their land rights. Second, despite lack of access 
to the courts, from the very beginning the Six Nations vigorously protested 
the taking of their lands to the New York State Legislature, Congress, and 
the public at large. Those efforts continue today. An informed 
understanding of this history is necessary in order to determine whether a 
political solution to the problems created by the unlawful taking of Six 
Nations’ land is possible. Without a thorough examination of the history of 
                                                                                                             
*i. Justice Souter, acknowledging that the Court’s decision turned on issues not fully briefed 
or developed by the parties, suggested that reargument was not necessary, and no 
opportunity to develop the factual record on delay need be provided, because the question of 
inaction was addressed briefly at oral argument. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 222 (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
 7. See Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation: A Regretful Postscript 
to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 5, 
16 (2005) (“The Oneida Indian Nation was as active as could be expected under the coercive 
historical circumstances. The Court overlooks the history, seemingly willfully, in concluding 
the Oneidas failed to take action in a timely manner.”); Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths 
of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006) (analyzing 
legal, political and practical obstacles Indian tribes faced in asserting their rights in court); 
see also Richard B. Collins & Karla D. Miller, A People Without Law, 5 INDIGENOUS L.J. 83 
(2006) (analyzing judicial decisions and other authorities regarding Indian tribes’ historic 
lack of capacity to sue). The U.S. Supreme Court does not appear eager to extend City of 
Sherrill beyond the unique facts of that case, despite the lower courts’ willingness to do so. 
The Court recently declined to address the question of whether City of Sherrill should limit 
an Indian tribe’s governmental powers in a reservation boundary disestablishment case. 
Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1082 (2016). 
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the Six Nations’ efforts to assert their land rights, City of Sherrill and its 
progeny may legitimize the dispossession of their land. 
The New York Indian Land Claim Framework: History and Law  
The Six Nations’ land rights actions arose because the State of New 
York violated federal law when it repeatedly purchased Indian lands—often 
under fundamentally unfair conditions—without congressional approval.
8
 
Courts have confirmed these violations of federal law.
9
 By the turn of the 
eighteenth century, if not before, New York officials knew that the 1790 
Trade and Intercourse Act required federal supervision and approval for any 
land deals with Indian nations.
10
 Yet for nearly five decades, between 1788 
and 1845, the State embarked on a systematic and aggressive campaign to 
acquire the lands of the Six Nations in violation of that statute.
11
 The State’s 
                                                                                                             
 8. The New York Indian land claims are based on the Trade and Intercourse Act of 
1790, which provides: 
[N]o sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within 
the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, 
whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same 
shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority 
of the United States. 
Trade and Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (current version at 
25 U.S.C. § 177). The Act was re-enacted several times after 1790, with this provision or 
nearly identical language included in each. Oneida Indian Nation v. Cty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 
661, 668 n.4 (1974). Because only Congress may ratify treaties under the Constitution, the 
Act meant that neither individuals, states, nor political subdivisions of states could acquire 
Indian land without authorization and approval from Congress.  
 9. See, e.g., Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 230 (1985); 
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1128 
(2006). 
 10. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 165 F. Supp. 2d 266, 334 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(noting that in 1795 during New York’s land negotiations with several Indian nations, U.S. 
Secretary of War Timothy Pickering sent New York Governors Clinton and Jay the legal 
opinion of U.S. Attorney General Bradford that the Trade and Intercourse Act prohibited the 
sale of Indian lands to the State except pursuant to a federal treaty). 
 11. See generally Robert N. Clinton & Margaret Tobey Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement 
of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land 
Claims, 31 ME. L. REV. 17, 43 (1979) (noting that New York State entered into nearly 200 
treaties with Indian nations to acquire their land). See, e.g., Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 
730 F. Supp. 485 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that New York State’s acquisition of 64,015 
acres of Cayuga land in 1795 and 1807 violated the Nonintercourse Act); Oneida Indian 
Nation v. Cty. of Oneida, 199 F.R.D. 61 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (allowing filing of amended 
complaint by Oneida alleging that thirty separate transactions purportedly conveying 
250,000 acres violated the Nonintercourse Act); Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 206 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/2
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efforts yielded one of the largest illegal transfers of Indian land in American 
history. The Six Nations were dispossessed of most of their treaty-protected 
aboriginal territory, an area encompassing central and western New York 
State and parts of present-day Pennsylvania.
12
 In many cases, the State 
made deals with individuals it knew lacked authority to negotiate land 
cessions.
13
 In some cases, the State deceived Indian nations into thinking 
they were leasing rather than selling their land.
14
 The State typically paid 
                                                                                                             
F. Supp. 2d 448 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing facts of New York State’s acquisition of 
Seneca Islands in the Niagara River); Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New 
York, 278 F. Supp. 2d 313 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing New York State’s acquisition of 
15,000 acres of Mohawk land); Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05–cv–0314, 2010 
WL 3806492, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010) (discussing New York State’s acquisition of 
two million acres of Onondaga land); see also Barbara Graymont, New York State Indian 
Policy After the Revolution, 57 N.Y. HIST. 438, 440 (1976) (discussing State’s land 
acquisition policy). 
 12. See, e.g., Cty. of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 230 (stating that the Oneidas’ aboriginal land 
was “approximately six million acres, extending from the Pennsylvania border to the St. 
Lawrence River, from the shores of Lake Ontario to the western foothills of the Adirondack 
Mountains”). 
 13. For example, upon learning in 1789 that New York State had made land cession 
treaties with the Onondagas, Oneidas, and Cayugas, the Six Nations Confederacy informed 
New York Governor Clinton that such agreements were invalid because they had been 
entered into by “a few of our wrong headed young Men, without the Consent or even 
Knowledge of the Chiefs.” Message from Six Nations Council to Governor Clinton (June 2, 
1789), in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, APPOINTED BY LAW 
FOR EXTINGUISHMENT OF INDIAN TITLES IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 331, 331 (Franklin B. 
Hough ed., Albany, N.Y., Joel Munsell 1861), https://archive.org/details/proceedings 
ofcom02newy [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONERS]; see Pataki, 165 F. Supp. 
2d at 315 (noting evidence that in land transaction with the Cayugas, Onondagas, and 
Oneidas, the State dealt with minority factions and not the authorized leaders).  
 14. For example, at Fort Schuyler in 1788 during the State’s negotiations to acquire 
Oneida lands, Governor Clinton falsely told the Oneidas that it was not the State’s “Intention 
to . . . Purchase Lands from you for our People.” Address by Governor Clinton to the 
Oneidas (Sept. 20, 1788), in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONERS, supra note 13, at 223, 
224, https://archive.org/details/proceedingsofcom01newy. After the agreement that sold their 
lands, the Chiefs believed the Nation had negotiated a lease: “We returned home possessed 
with an Idea that we had leased our Country to the People of the State, reserving a Rent 
which was to increase with the increase of the Settlements on our Lands until the whole 
Country was settled, and then to remain a standing Rent forever.” Message from the Oneida 
Council to Governor Clinton (Jan. 27, 1790), in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONERS, 
supra note 13, at 360, 360. The Fort Schuyler Treaty of 1788 purported to convey all of the 
Oneida’s aboriginal lands of six million acres except for a reservation of 300,000 acres. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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Indian nations a small fraction of what the land was worth.
15
 When the land 
rush was over, the Six Nations held only one-tenth of one percent of their 
treaty-protected aboriginal lands. 
The experience of the Onondaga Nation was typical. The Onondagas 
owned approximately two million acres as their aboriginal territory, 
stretching in a fifty mile-wide strip from the Canadian border to 
Pennsylvania through what is now the City of Syracuse. Even before the 




In 1784, the Six Nations and the United States entered into the Treaty of 
Fort Stanwix.
17
 The Six Nations ceded lands in the Ohio Valley in return 
for guarantees that they “be secured in the peaceful possession of the lands 
they inhabit east and north” of a boundary line drawn south from Lake 
Erie.
18
 The United States also agreed to protect the Onondagas’ land by 
“receiv[ing] [the Onondagas] into their protection.”
19
 The United States 
made additional promises to protect the lands of the Six Nations and the 
Onondagas in the Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794.
20
 In article II of the 
Treaty, the United States acknowledged as the property of the Onondaga 
Nation the lands reserved in the “treaties” with New York State.
21
 The 
Treaty further declared that the reserved lands “shall remain theirs, until 
they choose to sell” to the United States.
22
  
Despite these federal protections, New York State waged a targeted 
campaign to dispossess the Onondagas of their lands. In 1788, the State 
entered into an agreement with the Onondagas that purported to cede all but 
about 300,000 acres to the State, an area that was subsequently reduced to 
6900 acres. Although State negotiators knew that the individuals who 
signed the 1788 cession had no authority to act on the Onondaga Nation’s 
                                                                                                             
 15. See, e.g., Pataki, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 348 (finding that payment by the State to the 
Cayuga for lands conveyed under the 1795 Treaty of fifty cents per acre was nine times less 
than what private landowners were willing to bid for such lands). 
 16. The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix established a boundary line between the Six 
Nations and the colonies of Great Britain. 1 E. B. O’CALLAGHAN, THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 587-91 (Albany, N.Y., Weed, Parsons & Co., 1849), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924055329670;view=1up;seq=9. 
 17. Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Six Nations-U.S., Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15. 
 18. Id. at art. III.  
 19. Id. at pmbl.  
 20. Treaty of Canandaigua, Six Nations-U.S., Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44. But see Treaty 
with the Seven Nations of Canada, Seven Nations-N.Y., May 31, 1796, 7 Stat. 55. 
 21. Treaty of Canandaigua, supra note 20, at art. II. 
 22. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/2
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behalf, the State nonetheless consummated the transactions and proceeded 
to take possession of this vast tract.
23
 Moreover, in later fraudulent 
transactions, such as a purported purchase in 1793, the State deceived the 
Onondagas by stating they were leasing, rather than selling, their lands.
24
 
By any standard, the terms of these deals were grossly unfair. For all of the 
Onondaga land lost between 1788 and 1822, the Onondagas received only 
$33,380 in cash, $1000 in clothing, an annuity of $2430, and 150 bushels of 
salt.
25
 The State’s predatory conduct, and the one-sided nature of the 
transactions, underscore the wisdom of Congress’s requirement in the Trade 
and Intercourse Act that the federal government supervise the State’s land 
dealings with the Six Nations and approve any cessions. 
In dealing with the Onondagas and others of the Six Nations, New York 
confiscated land protected by federal statute and ratified treaties. 
Nonetheless, lawyers for the modern-day defendants within the former Six 
                                                                                                             
 23. On June 2, 1789, the Five Nations protested to the President that the lands “sold” to 
the State “by our Young men and wrong-headed People” were “Contrary to our Ancient 
Customs & in direct Contradiction to the Governors own Language to us and not confirm’d 
at our great Council Fire at Buffaloe Creek.” Letter to the President of the United States 
from the Sachems, Chiefs and Warriors of the Five Nations Assembled in Council at Buffalo 
Creek (June 2, 1789), in Grievances from the Five Nations to Congress, PAPERS OF THE WAR 
DEP’T 1784-1800, http://wardepartmentpapers.org/document.php?id=3589 (last visited May 
8, 2018). The chiefs also protested to Governor Clinton on July 30, 1789: 
We endeavoured to explain to you that you had not treated with the Chiefs, nor 
with Persons authorised by them to dispose of our Country, but we are now 
sorry to find you do not wish to be convinced of an Error, which you took no 
previous Steps to avoid. 
Letter from Joseph Brandt and Other Indians to Governor Clinton (July 30, 1789), in 2 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONERS, supra note 13, at 340, 340. 
 24. At the negotiations for the 1793 Onondaga agreement, the State’s representative 
unequivocally stated that they “did not come to buy your land,” but rather sought only a 
lease. Proceedings of the Negotiations Between the Onondaga Nation and Commissioners of 
the State of New York, Simeon De Witt and John Cantine (1793), quoted in Declaration of J. 
David Lehman in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss at 34, Onondaga Nation v. 
New York, No. 05-CV-314 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2006), 2006 WL 6897841. The State’s 
record of the negotiations confirms that the Onondagas believed they had entered into a 
lease: “After deliberating on our last speech the Onondagaes informed us that they had 
agreed to lease part of their Reservation . . . .” Id., quoted in Declaration of J. David 
Lehman, supra, at 35. 
 25. The New York State agreements with the Onondagas are compiled in N.Y. 
LEGISLATURE SPECIAL COMM., REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE INDIAN 
PROBLEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, APPOINTED BY THE ASSEMBLY OF 1888, at 190-211 
(Albany, N.Y., Troy Press Co. 1889), https://books.google.com/books?id=uReLy9BjUDIC& 
printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
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Nations territory have argued it would be unjust for the courts to provide 
any remedy for wrongs committed nearly 200 years ago. In response, the 
Six Nations have proposed remedies that would not disturb the possession 
of present-day landowners or impose upon them any responsibility for 
righting these centuries-old wrongs.
26
  
Resolving these claims politically requires careful attention to complex 
historical and juridical questions: why did the litigation to remedy the loss 
of Indian land begin nearly two hundred years after the takings? Could 
Indian nations have sought a remedy earlier? What opportunities were 
available to Indian nations to resolve claims to land based on the Trade and 
Intercourse Act? What did Indian nations do to protest the loss of their 
lands? What political and legal obstacles may have prevented Indian 
nations from pursuing their claims? The answers to these questions lie in 
the historical record that courts thus far have largely ignored. 
Lack of Access to Federal Courts 
Modern efforts to remedy historic wrongs should take into account the 
extent to which Indian nations had access to the courts to seek redress for 
the loss of their lands. Indian nations did not have access to the federal 
courts until 1974, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that land claims 
against New York State raised federal issues within federal jurisdiction.
27
 
New York state courts were likewise unavailable because of state law 
doctrines holding that the nations lacked the legal capacity to sue.
28
  
From the beginning, relations between Indian nations and the United 
States were carried out on a nation-to-nation basis.
29
 As a result, Indian 
                                                                                                             
 26. For example, the Onondaga Nation sought only a declaratory judgment against the 
State, governmental entities, and several corporations that had polluted the claimed lands. 
No dispossession of non-Indian landowners was sought. See Onondaga Nation v. New York, 
No. 5:05–cv–0314, 2010 WL 3806492 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010). 
 27. Oneida Indian Nation v. Cty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974). The basis of federal 
jurisdiction is the principle that federal treaties with the Six Nations and the federal common 
law protect the tribal right to possession of their lands.  
 28. Id. at 674. 
 29. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). The Court stated that 
although the Cherokees were not a foreign state in the constitutional sense, 
[s]o much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of the 
Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, 
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of 
a majority of the judges, been completely successful. They have been 
uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country. . . . The acts of 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/2
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relations have always been “the exclusive province of federal law.”
30
 In one 
of the first Supreme Court cases involving Indian nations, the Court 
declared that “[t]he treaties and laws of the United States contemplate . . . 
that all intercourse with [Indians] shall be carried on exclusively by the 
government of the union.”
31
 This description of the relationship was more 
than an abstract legal doctrine; as a practical matter, the federal-Indian 
treaties meant that virtually all aspects of the relationship with the United 
States had a federal character. For example, article VII of the Treaty of 
Canandaigua of 1794 requires the Six Nations to use diplomacy with the 
President to resolve complaints about the conduct of United States 
citizens.
32
 Naturally, then, if executive action could not resolve a dispute, 
the federal courts should have been an appropriate forum.  
Before the early twentieth century, history records few instances in 
which Indian nations sought relief in federal courts for loss of their lands. 
Indian litigants might have had two avenues available: an original suit in 
the Supreme Court under its jurisdiction between states and foreign states,
33
 
or a suit in the federal district courts.
34
 The first option was foreclosed very 
early in United States’ history. In 1831, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Cherokee Nation was not a “foreign state” for purposes of the Court’s 
original jurisdiction, and as a result, the Nation could not file suit directly in 
that Court against the State of Georgia to stop its seizure of Nation lands.
35
 
This ruling meant that after 1831, near the end of New York’s most 
aggressive period of land acquisition, the Six Nations could not have filed 
suit in the Supreme Court to vindicate their land and treaty rights. 
Similar obstacles were present with regard to the lower federal courts. 
Congress established federal courts in New York State in the Judiciary Act 
of 1789,
36
 but the courts’ jurisdiction was limited to cases in which the 
                                                                                                             
our government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts 
are bound by those acts. 
Id. 
 30. Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985).  
 31. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).  
 32. Treaty of Canandaigua, supra note 20, at art. VII. 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 34. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73, 73-74 (establishing federal 
district courts in New York State); Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (establishing 
jurisdiction of lower federal courts over certain actions). 
 35. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).  
 36. Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 3-5, 1 Stat. at 73-75. 
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litigants had citizenship from different states.
37
 As an avenue for land rights 
litigation, the diversity of citizenship requirement was problematic for two 
reasons. First, Indian nations have never been considered citizens for 
purposes of federal law.
38
 Second, with few exceptions (not including the 
Six Nations), individual members of Indian nations did not obtain 
citizenship status until a 1924 act of Congress.
39
 Even after 1924, federal 
diversity jurisdiction over Indian land rights cases would most likely not 
have been available because the defendants had the same New York state 
citizenship status as the individual Indian litigants. Additionally, because 
Indian land rights are held by the Indian nation rather than citizens of the 
nation, the cause of action for violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act is 
held by the nation and individuals cannot sue to vindicate such rights.
40
 
Indian nations would have fared no better under the expanded basis for 
federal court jurisdiction that Congress enacted in 1875.
41
 In that statute, 
Congress authorized federal courts to hear claims based on federal treaties, 
statutes, and the Constitution.
42
 From the perspective of Indian nations, the 
new statute would have appeared to be a natural option for land rights 
claims, as federally ratified treaties were at the heart of such claims. 
Remarkably, however, the promise of the 1875 statute was not realized for 
nearly one hundred years after its enactment. In 1914, in Taylor v. 
Anderson, the Supreme Court turned back an effort to have a federal court 
in Oklahoma decide whether certain Choctaws had conveyed an allotment 
to a non-Indian in violation of a federal statute that prohibited such 
conveyances without the approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
43
 The 
Court ruled that the federal question must arise from the “plaintiff’s 
statement of his own claim” and cannot arise “in anticipation or avoidance 
                                                                                                             
 37. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (noting that the 
jurisdictional act required that the suit be between a “citizen of a state where the suit is 
brought, and a citizen of another state”).  
 38. See Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Because the case for 
considering an Indian tribe a citizen of a state is tenuous at best, the diversity statute’s 
provision for suits between citizens of different states, strictly construed, cannot be said to 
embrace suits involving Indian tribes.”) (citation omitted).  
 39. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253. The Act declared all non-citizen Indians 
“born within the territorial limits of the United States” to be citizens of the United States. Id., 
43 Stat. at 253. 
 40. See, e.g., Canadian St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. New York, 573 F. Supp. 1530 
(N.D.N.Y. 1983) (dismissing such claims by individual Mohawk plaintiffs). 
 41. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.  
 42. Id. § 1, 18 Stat. at 470. 
 43. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914).  
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of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.”
44
 This case 
failed that test because the federal question arose as a defense. The 
plaintiffs claimed the land and sought to evict the defendant; the defendant 
claimed good title under a conveyance from the Choctaws; and the plaintiff 
responded that the defendant’s title was invalid under the federal statute 
requiring federal approval of the conveyance.
45
  
Taylor presented a particularly difficult legal obstacle because the 
procedural posture of that case was similar to the way Indian claims would 
likely be presented to the federal courts. And, in fact, Taylor was invoked 
by the federal courts in New York in 1929 in a Mohawk lawsuit seeking to 
evict a power company alleged to be occupying land belonging to the 
Mohawk Nation under the Treaty of 1796.
46
 Deere v. St. Lawrence River 
Power Co. was a major test case of the legality of New York State’s 
acquisition of Six Nations’ land in violation of federal treaties and the 
Trade and Intercourse Act.
47
 The Mohawk plaintiffs argued that because 
federal law and federal treaties protected their rights to land, the action 
arose under federal law and the federal court therefore had jurisdiction.
48
 
Citing Taylor, the Deere court rejected the Mohawk suit and held that the 
federal courts lacked jurisdiction over such claims.
49
 
Combined with the absence of federal diversity jurisdiction, the courts’ 
rejection of claims to federal question jurisdiction meant the federal courts 
were closed to Six Nations’ land rights actions. The denial of access lasted 
until the 1970s, nearly two hundred years after the State of New York’s 
unlawful takings. Throughout this long period, the Six Nations could not 
have obtained a remedy in federal court for New York State’s seizure of 
their lands, even if they had had the financial means to hire attorneys to file 
such actions. Even when they persuaded the federal government to sue on 
their behalf during this period, the Six Nations fared no better. When the 
United States sought a remedy in federal court for the taking of Mohawk 
                                                                                                             
 44. Id. at 75-76. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Deere v. St. Lawrence River Power Co., 32 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 47. See Indians Claim Half of New York: Test Suit Is Based on an 18th Century Treaty 
Which Is Still in Force, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1924, at 4 (noting hiring of legal counsel to 
press claim to land confirmed in federal treaties and lost without meeting the “requirements 
laid down by the federal government”). 
 48. Deere, 32 F.2d at 551. 
 49. Id. at 552 (“A guaranty of the right of possession by a treaty of the United States 
does not render an action in ejectment to recover possession of the property a case arising 
under a treaty of the United States, in so far as the jurisdictional statute is concerned.”). 
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lands in violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act, the federal court held 
that the Act did not apply to New York State.
50
  
Not until 1974 did the Supreme Court rule that, contrary to Taylor and 
Deere, Indian claims based on New York’s violations of the Trade and 
Intercourse Act raised federal questions subject to the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.
51
 That year, in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 
the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear claims 
based on violations of the Trade and Intercourse Act because the Oneidas’ 
complaint “asserted a current right to possession conferred by federal law, 
wholly independent of state law.”
52
 The Court observed that from the time 
of the formation of the United States, “federal law, treaties, and statutes 
protected Indian occupancy, and . . . its termination was exclusively the 
province of federal law.”
53
 The Court’s clarification of the federal legal 
basis of Indian land rights was a significant legal development implicitly 
confirming that the federal courts had been closed to land claims by Indian 
nations for more than 150 years. Although the Court traced the federal 
protection of Indian land rights to the formation of the United States, as a 
practical matter, this principle was not available to Indian nations to 
vindicate their land rights until the Court issued its ruling in 1974.  
Lack of Access to State Courts 
The option of pursuing Trade and Intercourse Act claims in New York 
state courts raised similarly insurmountable challenges. State courts 
generally have been inhospitable fora for the adjudication of claims to 
vindicate Indian rights. The Supreme Court has recognized this fact, finding 
that the states are often the “deadliest enemies” of Indian nations.
54
 
Nevertheless, access to state courts might have been better than no court 
                                                                                                             
 50. United States v. Franklin Cty., 50 F. Supp. 152, 156 (N.D.N.Y. 1943). The Court 
candidly admitted that its decision was motivated in part by the desire to “remove any cloud 
upon the validity” of numerous titles derived from state “treaties” that were made with 
Indian nations without the authorization or approval of the United States, as required by the 
Trade and Intercourse Act. Id.  
 51. Oneida Indian Nation v. Cty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974).  
 52. Id. at 666.  
 53. Id. at 670.  
 54. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). The Court attributed this 
condition to “local ill feeling” and the fact that Indian nations owe no allegiance to the states 
and receive no protection from them; see also New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 
F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2012) (Hall, J., dissenting) (stating that the development of federal 
Indian law reflects an accommodation of the “historically thorny nature of tribal-state 
relations and a fear of ‘home cooking’ in state courts”). 
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access at all, and Indian nations tried diligently to avail themselves of this 
forum.  
The historical record reveals that the New York State Legislature erected 
significant obstacles to state court actions claiming violations of Indian land 
rights under federal law. In its earliest relations with Indian nations, the 
legislature acted on the assumption that the nations lacked the capacity to 
bring legal actions in their own name, and that, as a result, the State needed 
to appoint attorneys as “trustees” to represent their interests. This strategy 
also gave the State substantial control over what actions it filed on behalf of 
Indian nations and how those suits were litigated. 
The earliest such legislation, enacted in 1793, concerned the Onondagas, 
Oneidas, and Cayugas. The 1793 Act appointed three individuals to 
negotiate for the sale of these nations’ land, as well as authorized them to 
propose that the State’s Attorney General would act as trustee “to bring 
suits for trespass [on their lands], and to prosecute the same to effect for the 
benefit of said Indians.”
55
 A similar law was enacted in 1796 with regard to 
the Brothertown Indians.
56
 That Act provided that the governor and the 
Council of Appointment should appoint an attorney for the Nation to 
“defend all suits brought against any of them by any white person, and 
commence and prosecute all such suits and actions for them or any of them 
as he may find necessary or proper.”
57
  
Another example concerned the Mohawk Nation. In 1808, the state 
legislature enacted a law providing that “it shall be the duty of the district 
attorney, residing in the county of Washington, to . . . commence and 
prosecute all such actions for [the St. Regis Indians] . . . as he may find 
proper and necessary.”
58
 Because the St. Regis Indians held their lands as 
tenants in common, the statute was amended in 1811 to clarify that it would 
be 
lawful for the [Washington County] district attorney, in all suits 
which he may find proper and necessary to commence and 
prosecute on behalf of the said Indians, to bring the same in the 
name of the Saint Regis Indians, without naming any of the 
                                                                                                             
 55. An Act Relative to the Lands Appropriated by This State to the Use of the Oneida, 
Onondaga and Cayuga Indians, ch. 51, 1793 N.Y. Laws 454, 455.  
 56. An Act for the Relief of Indians Who Are Entitled to Lands in Brothertown, ch. 22, 
1796 N.Y. Laws 655, 657. 
 57. Id. 
 58. An Act Relative to the Lot of Land Appropriated for the Use of the Missionary to 
the Oneida Tribe of Indians, and for Other Purposes, ch. 236, 1808 N.Y. Laws 410, 410.  
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These laws reflected the widespread State practice of authorizing the 
appointment of attorneys to represent Indian nations during the period of 
New York’s most aggressive land deals. The state courts soon concluded 
that state-appointed attorneys had exclusive authority to bring actions on 
behalf of Indian nations. In 1817, the Supreme Court of New York ruled 
that state-appointed attorneys had exclusive authority “to prosecute and 
defend all actions by or against any of the Indians, whose interests are 
committed to [them].”
60
 The court reasoned that if Indians were allowed to 
choose their own attorneys, “they may be involved in ruinous litigation; and 
they may too carelessly vex against whom they have resentments.”
61
 The 
court did not name the State as a party that might stir Indian “resentments,” 
but at the time of the decision, the Six Nations were carrying out a twenty-
year crusade to protest New York’s taking of their lands in violation of 
federal law. In any event, Reynolds put Indian nations in the untenable 
position of having to depend on the State itself—the entity that wrongfully 
took their lands—to challenge the wrongful takings in court.  
In some cases, the State attorneys’ interests were further misaligned with 
their Indian nation clients’ because of personal ties to the disputed lands or 
broader political ambitions at odds with their Indian clients’ goals. The 
historical record demonstrates the impact of this misalignment at Onondaga 
and St. Regis. 
After illegally acquiring 640 acres from the St. Regis Mohawk Indians in 
1824, the State sold the tract to a relative of the county attorney assigned to 
represent the interests of the St. Regis Indians in court.
62
 Two decades later, 
William Almon Wheeler, who represented the St. Regis Mohawks as 
Franklin County District Attorney in the mid-1800s, pursued state and 
national political ambitions at the same time. Wheeler was elected to the 
New York State Legislature immediately following his term as Franklin 
County attorney and to the Vice Presidency of the United States twenty 
years later. Not a single suit challenging the State’s unlawful land 
                                                                                                             
 59. An Act Supplementary to the Act Entitled, “An Act Relative to the Lot of Land 
Appropriated for the Use of the Missionary to the Oneida Tribe of Indians, and for Other 
Purposes,” ch. 243, 1811 N.Y. Laws 326, 326. 
 60. Jackson ex dem. Van Dyke v. Reynolds, 14 Johns. 335, 336 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817).  
 61. Id. at 337. 
 62. See An Act for the Relief of the St. Regis Indians, ch. 80, 1824 N.Y. Laws 73 
(appointing Asa Hascall to represent St. Regis); An Act for the Relief of Lemuel Hascall, ch. 
129, 1825 N.Y. Laws 228 (conveying the mile square to Lemuel Hascall).  
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acquisitions was brought on the Mohawks’ behalf throughout the nineteenth 
century, despite the Mohawk Nation’s vociferous objections to those 
takings in other fora. 
The Onondagas’ experience with legislatively-appointed attorneys was 
similarly bleak. On April 7, 1806, the legislature authorized the Council of 
Appointments to choose an attorney for the Onondagas, who would be paid 
$50 a year to file such actions “as he may find necessary and proper.”
63
 The 
attorney appointed, Medad Curtis, proved to be unsatisfactory to the 
Onondagas, who five years later petitioned the legislature to appoint a 
“resident agent” to address the “numerous and unprovoked trespasses and 
injuries which evil minded white persons commit upon the property and 
persons” of the Onondagas.
64
  
In 1811, Ephraim Webster was appointed as agent for the Onondagas to 
“hold that office during the pleasure of the legislature.”
65
 Although Webster 
was not a lawyer, his duties included advising the Onondagas “in 
controversies amongst themselves, and with other persons,” and 
prosecuting trespass actions against “any white person” that he may think 
was “necessary and proper.”
66
 Webster instead became an agent for the 
dispossession of the Onondagas. He facilitated two of the State’s unlawful 
agreements with the Onondaga Nation by acting as interpreter in the 
discussions, and pursuant to the 1817 agreement, received 300 acres of 
Onondaga land for his trouble. The Onondagas complained bitterly to New 
York’s Governor, arguing that Webster should be replaced because “we 
have been deceived by him, and . . . he does not attend to our concerns as 
he ought to do.”
67
 The Governor refused to replace Webster, who remained 
the Onondaga agent until his death in 1824, two years after the final 
Onondaga-State land transaction.  
Accordingly, under New York state law and practice, the decision to 
challenge New York’s taking of Indian lands was not within the Nations’ 
                                                                                                             
 63. An Act to Amend an Act, Entitled “An Act Relative to Indians,” ch. 161, § 9, 1806 
N.Y. Laws 601, 604.  
 64. JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, 34th Sess. 296-97 
(Albany, N.Y., S. Southwick 1811), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=chi.74626361;view 
=1up;seq=1.  
 65. An Act for the Benefit of the Onondaga Tribe of Indians and for Other Purposes, ch. 
79, § 2, 1811 N.Y. Laws 168, 168. 
 66. Id. § 2, 1811 N.Y. Laws at 168-69.  
 67. Petition from the Onondagas to Governor Clinton (Mar. 10, 1819), in JOURNAL OF 
THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, 42d Sess. 731, 731 (Albany, N.Y., J. Buel 
1819) (on file with the American Indian Law Review).  
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control. Lacking independent attorneys, the Onondagas and Mohawks were 
essentially powerless to use the state courts to vindicate their land rights. 
State-court created rules confirming this powerlessness kept the Six 
Nations from vindicating their land rights in state court for over a century. 
For example, in Strong v. Waterman, the Seneca Nation brought an 
ejectment action in its own name.
68
 The New York Chancery Court ruled 
that the Nation lacked capacity to sue in the absence of specific state 
legislation authorizing the suit.
69
 Although Strong suggested that the Seneca 
Nation could authorize individual Nation members to bring the suit, that 
suggestion was not supported by New York state law at the time, which 
held that individual Indians were not citizens of the state and therefore 
lacked access to state court.
70
 Moreover, Strong addressed only lands within 
the recognized territory of an Indian nation, not those lands unlawfully 
acquired by New York State.
71
 
For nearly a century, the New York state courts applied the lack of 
capacity doctrine developed in Strong to other Indian nations, including the 
Onondaga Nation. In 1899, in Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, the Nation 
sued in the Supreme Court of Onondaga County to recover four wampum 
belts held by a non-Indian.
72
 The court dismissed the Nation’s claim for 
lack of capacity: 
[T]he statutes of the state . . . indicate the intent upon the part of 
the state to treat the Indians as wards, and, except when 
otherwise specially provided, to trust the protection of their 
rights, as tribes or nations, to its agents, rather than to 
proceedings by themselves. Where it was deemed wise to have 
tribal action in relation to tribal rights, as in the case of 
trespasses upon tribal lands . . . express authority is given for the 
prosecution of suits in the name of the ‘nation’ interested.
73
  
On appeal, the court of appeals denied capacity on either the part of the 
Nation or individuals authorized by the Nation to file suit: “[N]either the 
                                                                                                             
 68. 11 Paige Ch. 607 (N.Y. Ch. 1845). 
 69. Id. at 612.  
 70. See Goodell v. Jackson ex dem. Smith, 20 Johns. 693, 709-18 (N.Y. 1823). 
 71. Strong, 11 Paige Ch. at 611-12. 
 72. Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 61 N.Y.S. 1027 (Sup. Ct. 1899). 
 73. Id. at 1030. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol42/iss2/2
No. 2]      SIX NATIONS CONFEDERACY LAND CLAIMS 307 
 
 
Onondaga Nation, nor the individual Indians named as plaintiffs, had legal 
capacity to bring and maintain the action.”
74
  
Under Strong and Thacher, Onondaga and other Indian nations were 
barred from filing suit in state court absent express authorization by the 
state legislature. With limited exceptions, such authorization was not 
forthcoming. In 1940, the legislature authorized the Onondaga Nation to 
sue the Tully Pipe Line Company for injury to the cemetery on the Nation’s 
territory caused by the company’s failure to prevent salt from leaking from 
its pipeline.
75
 This exception proved the rule that the doors of the New York 
state courthouses were closed to Indian nations for more than a century.  
It was only in the mid-twentieth century that the New York State 
Legislature took any action to address Indian nations’ lack of access to state 
courts. In 1953, the legislature enacted a provision that purported to open 
the courts to Indian litigants.
76
 The law provided that “[a]ny action or 
proceeding between Indians or between one or more Indians and any other 
person or persons may be prosecuted in any court of the state to the same 
extent as provided by law for other actions or special proceedings.”
77
  
The statute was not, however, widely interpreted to establish the right of 
Indian nations to seek state court review of unlawful land purchases. In 
1956, the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe filed a state court action challenging the 
illegal appropriation of some of its lands by the state power authority.
78
 The 
Mohawks did not dispute the State’s contention that 
unless there is statutory authority no action for damages caused 
by the appropriation of tribal property may be brought by a tribe 
as an entity, or by an individual in a representative capacity on 
behalf of the tribe, or by an individual on behalf of himself 
insofar as his interests in such tribal property are concerned.
79
 
Instead, the Mohawks argued and the court agreed that a state statute 
authorizing suits by “[t]he owner of any property . . . appropriated” for 
public highways enabled the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe to pursue its claims.
80
 
                                                                                                             
 74. Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 62 N.E. 1098, 1098 (N.Y. 1901), aff’d, 189 U.S. 306 
(1903). 
 75. Act of Apr. 22, 1940, ch. 694, 1940 N.Y. Laws 1889. 
 76. Act of Apr. 13, 1953, ch. 671, 1953 N.Y. Laws 1517.  
 77. Id. sec. 1, § 5, 1953 N.Y. Laws at 1517.  
 78. See St. Regis Tribe of Mohawk Indians v. State, 158 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Ct. Cl. 1956).  
 79. Id. at 547.  
 80. Id. at 548; see also Mohawk Tribe v. New York, 152 N.E.2d 411 (N.Y. 1958) 
(noting on appeal that the State’s concession that the highway law overcame the Mohawks’ 
lack of capacity).  
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The Tribe argued that the State had not acquired good title to islands in the 
St. Lawrence River because it neither paid the Mohawks for them nor 
obtained the consent of Congress, as required by the Trade and Intercourse 
Act.
81
 While the state court acknowledged the Mohawks’ right to file suit, it 
denied their claim, holding that the Trade and Intercourse Act did not apply 
to New York State.
82
  
Even if the lack of capacity to sue could have been overcome, Congress 
erected a new jurisdictional barrier to state courts hearing Indian land 
claims in New York. In 1950, Congress prohibited New York state courts 
from exercising jurisdiction over Indian land claims arising before 1952, a 
category encompassing virtually all claims based on violations of the Trade 
and Intercourse Act by the State.
83
 As a result, whether because of lack of 
capacity to sue or the absence of jurisdiction, New York state courts were 
closed to Indian nations seeking remedies for New York’s violations of 
federal law. 
Six Nations’ Protests 
The futility of court action did not deter the Six Nations from protesting 
the loss of their lands or New York State’s duplicity. The Onondagas, for 
example, vigorously protested the bad faith of the State’s negotiators 
following each illegal land transaction. They emphasized the fact that the 
State made deals with individual Onondagas who did not have authority 
from the Council of Chiefs to negotiate about land. Onondaga Chief Clear 
Sky’s protest following the purported cession of 1793, the largest of the 
State’s land deals, is typical of the efforts of the Onondagas to protest the 
unlawful sales and to hold onto their land:  
[W]e wish to see the Governor and reveal our minds to him. As 
he has not before paid that attention to the principal Chiefs 
which he ought, as he has been trading with but few of the 
Indians living at Cayuga and Onondaga, which we consider as it 
                                                                                                             
 81. Mohawk Tribe, 152 N.E.2d at 417. 
 82. Id. at 419 (citing United States v. Franklin Cty., 50 F. Supp. 152 (N.D.N.Y 1943), 
discussed supra note 50).  
 83. Act of Sept. 13, 1950, ch. 947, 64 Stat. 845 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 233 (2012)). 
The statute provided 
[t]hat nothing herein contained shall be construed as conferring jurisdiction on 
the courts of the State of New York or making applicable the law of the State of 
New York in civil actions involving Indian lands or claims with respect thereto 
which relate to transactions or events transpiring prior to September 13, 1952. 
Id. § 1, 64 Stat. at 845-46. 
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were but Children with whom he has traded, which was not 
properly entitled to dispose of the lands without our consent. But 
has generally confirmed his bargains with those few and 
neglected the principal Chiefs who are the proper owners of the 
land. 
 . . . [W]e consider [the Governor] as one who wishes to 
defraud us of our land.
84
 
Direct appeals to New York State’s Governor did not result in a single 
instance where land was returned or any other remedy provided for the 
massive loss of Onondaga land. The Onondagas thus took their case about 
the illegality of the land cessions directly to the President. In 1802, for 
example, a delegation of Six Nations chiefs, including the Onondagas, met 
with President Jefferson and then with the Secretary of War to discuss 
possible redress for the State’s violations of Six Nations’ land rights. 
Secretary of War Henry Dearborn responded: “Your good father the 
President of the United States having seen your talk of yesterday directs me 
to assure you, that his ears are ever open to the just complaints of his red 
children and his heart ever disposed to afford them relief.”
85
 The President 
then issued an executive order confirming Onondaga title to “all lands 
claimed by and secured” to them by “Treaty, Convention or deed.”
86
 This 
additional measure of protection for Six Nations land did not deter New 
York State from forcing further cessions of their lands, nor did it provide 
the basis for a federal remedy for those lands already lost.  
Like the Onondagas, the Mohawks attempted to use political avenues to 
vindicate their land rights when judicial options were unavailable. Prior to 
filing suit over the St. Lawrence islands, the Mohawk Nation petitioned the 
state legislature for recognition of their rights to the islands and demanded 
that rent and damages be paid by those in unlawful possession.
87
 While the 
                                                                                                             
 84. Chief Clear Sky, Address to General Israel Chapin (Mar. 4, 1794), in N.Y. SENATE 
COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN 
AFFAIRS RELATIVE TO THE CAYUGA INDIANS UNDER RESOLUTION OF MAY 15, 1889, at 464, 
465 (Albany, N.Y., James B. Lyon 1890), https://books.google.com/books?id=9bw 
RAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false.  
 85. Henry Dearborn, Sec’y of War, Confirmation of Land Rights of Senecas and 
Onondagas (Mar. 17, 1802), quoted in Declaration of J. David Lehman, supra note 24, at 26.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Report of the Commissioners of the Land Office on the Petition of the Trustees of 
the St. Regis Indians in Relation to Certain Islands in the River St. Lawrence (Mar. 23, 
1843), in 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, 66th Sess., No. 136 
(Albany, N.Y., Carroll & Cook 1843); Report of the Committee on Claims on the Petition of 
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St. Regis Tribe succeeded in winning legislative recognition of their title to 
the islands, they did not receive any full measure of justice for their 
dispossession and continued to press the state legislature to vindicate their 
claims.
88
 The nineteenth century decision by the state legislature to provide 
a modest payment in lieu of back rents was later interpreted by the State 
courts as having extinguished title.
89
  
Throughout history, and whenever their means allowed, the Six Nations 
have protested the loss of their lands at state and federal levels. One 
prominent protest opportunity arose in 1919 in the form of the Everett 
Commission. In that year, the federal court of appeals in New York ruled in 
United States v. Boylan
90
 that the mortgage of Oneida land without 
congressional authorization or approval violated the Trade and Intercourse 
Act and that any non-Indian interest derived from the foreclosure of the 
property upon the death of the Oneida owner was invalid.
91
 Although 
Boylan did not address the question of whether Indian nations themselves 
could bring such suits under the Trade and Intercourse Act, the court’s 
ruling raised the possibility that the purported cessions of millions of acres 
of Indian land were void for violation of the Act if the United States sued 
on the nations’ behalf, and that some, if not all, of the land would need to 
be returned.  
The specter of being held accountable for the State’s conduct in 
acquiring Six Nations land, and in particular, the implications of the Boylan 
court’s eviction of the non-Indian occupiers of Oneida land, spurred the 
creation of a commission to study the problem. Known as the Everett 
Commission after its chair, State Assemblyman E.A. Everett, the group of 
thirteen commissioners held hearings throughout Six Nations communities 
in 1920 to investigate concerns about land and jurisdiction. Tadadaho and 
Onondaga Chief George Thomas told the commissioners that the federal 
government should “see that the treaties of 1795 (sic)” between the Six 
Nations and the United States should “be lived up to by the said 
government. We firmly believe that the State of New York has no 
                                                                                                             
the British St. Regis Indians (Jan. 25, 1854), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE 
STATE OF NEW-YORK, 77th Sess., No. 27 (Albany, N.Y., C. Van Benthuysen 1854). 
 88. See, e.g., Defender of Indian Claims and Rights, WAR WHOOP (St. Regis 
Reservation), May 22, 1941, at 1 (vol. 1, no. 4) (on file with the American Indian Law 
Review) (report of Peter Johnson regarding 1935 St. Regis appeal to Albany in connection 
with land claim).  
 89. Mohawk Tribe v. New York, 152 N.E.2d 411, 418 (N.Y. 1958).  
 90. 265 F. 165 (2d Cir. 1920). 
 91. Id. at 174. 
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jurisdiction over the [Six] Nations of New York State.”
92
 Another 
Onondaga, Jarvis Pierce, told the commissioners: 
I hold that the state has no jurisdiction and therefore all of the 
lands will have to be thrown up and you will have to clear the 
city of Syracuse as you said you would redeem all lands taken 
wrongfully. Shall we call for a new treaty or go to the United 
States and say the State has taken our land wrongfully?
93
 
Another witness framed the question for the Commission in these terms: 
“The fundamental of this question is to get back to whether the whole of the 
State of New York belongs to these Indians and if they should have 
compensation for what they have lost.”
94
 
Chairman Everett agreed with the fundamental justice of the Six 
Nations’ complaints: 
I maintain that you are the owners of all the territory that was 
ceded to you at the close of the Revolutionary War and unless 
you disposed of that property by an instrument as legal and 
binding and necessary as the conditions of that treaty was to 




Not surprisingly, the New York State Legislature did not act on the Everett 
Commission’s findings and conclusions. The Commission’s work, 
however, was widely disseminated in the media at the time, further giving 
voice to the Six Nations’ protests. On February 10, 1922, the Syracuse 
Post-Standard reported that the findings of Chairman Everett that the “Six 
Nations of Indians residing within New York state have title to lands 




                                                                                                             
 92. N.Y. STATE INDIAN COMM’N, REPORT TO INVESTIGATE THE STATUS OF THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN RESIDING IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 63 (1972 reprint), 
http://nysl.cloudapp.net/awweb/guest.jsp?smd=1&cl=all_lib&lb_document_id=10512 (the 
“Everett Report”). The original report, dated March 17, 1922, “had almost completely 
vanished” after its rejection by the legislature, until its public release in 1972. Id. at i.  
 93. Id. at 64.  
 94. Id. at 38-39 (statement of George E. Vaux, chairman of the Federal Indian 
Commission).  
 95. Id. at 320.  
 96. Indians Own Ceded Lands: Chairman of State Commission Sends Findings to All 
Chiefs: Many Titles Clouded: Assemblyman Everett Admits Other Members of Board May 
Disagree, SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD, Feb. 10, 1922, at 3 (on file with the American Indian 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
312 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
 
 
During this period, the Six Nations also took their protests to Congress. 
In 1929, the Senate undertook a survey of the conditions of American 
Indians, and the Six Nations took advantage of this opportunity to raise the 
illegality of New York State’s acquisition of their lands. A formal petition 
was submitted that identified the loss of their lands as the principal concern 
of the Six Nations with regard to their relations with the United States. The 
Six Nations’ Petition summarized the history of their land cessions as 
follows: 
 2. That the officials of the State of New York from 1784 
through the years willfully defied President Washington and his 
successors; defied the Congress of the United States, the 
Supreme Court, and the United States Constitution. 
 . . . . 
 4. That every foot of land bought from the Mohawks, 
Oneidas, Cayugas, and Onondagas was illegally obtained in 
absolute contravention to the laws of Congress, to the United 
States Constitution, and to the treaties. 
 5. That President Washington vigorously protested to 
Governor Clinton that these so-called State treaties were made 
and the land taken away in utter contempt of Federal authority. 
 . . . . 
 8. That the State of New York has taken these lands illegally 
procured from nations of the Six Nations and has issued State 
patents to its citizens for same. 
 9. That the United States Government has issued no patents 
for any of this land and that the patents issued by the State are 
null and void and have no force or effect. 
 10. That a great deal of this land, especially city real estate, 
has no title but is strictly on lease.
97
 
The Petition presaged the modern courts’ concerns about the effect of the 
passage of time on the ability of the Six Nations to assert their claims in 
court and correctly pointed out that legal doctrines of repose cannot 
properly be applied when the courts were not open to assert such claims: 
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“That the Six Nations Confederacy vigorously protested to the Federal 
Government through the years so that no statute of limitations can run 
against them; that the law of laches does not apply to people who have no 
power to sue.”
98
 Throughout the twentieth century, the Six Nations 
continued to press their claims in Congress.
99
  
The Six Nations weighed in on congressional proposals to address 
relations between New York State and the Six Nations and criticized 
measures that would hinder their ability to seek justice for their land claims 
against the State. For example, in 1948, several bills were introduced giving 
the State civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Six Nations and their lands. 
Among the Six Nations, opposition to these bills was unanimous and 
leaders from the Onondaga, Mohawk, and other Nations attended hearings 
to protest the proposed legislation. An overriding concern was the effect the 
legislation would have on land claims. The Nations saw the State’s attempt 
to seize jurisdiction as a means to escape liability for the taking of Six 
Nations’ land. Tadadaho and Onondaga Nation Chief George Thomas 
explained: 
The whole thing in a nutshell is this, and that is that [sic] we 
have been trying to ascertain. The claims that we have against 
the State of New York are enormous, probably one of the biggest 
cases in the whole history of Indian relations, and we have been 
beating around the bushes so much, I notice, and we all point to 
this fact that we have this tremendous claim.
100
 
Chief Thomas predicted that the passage of the bills would “hamper the 
transaction of the negotiations for a settlement of these claims if we transfer 
the jurisdiction. That would be the most dangerous weapon that they could 
use against us, and we are not going to allow that to happen, if we can help 
it.”
101
 Onondaga Chief Livingston Crouse echoed that concern: “In other 
words, once the State takes over, that means we are diminished, absolutely 
ruined. There is no confederacy any longer. . . . That is the way to break up 
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For nearly two hundred years, federal and state courts were closed to the 
Indian nations whose lands were taken illegally by the State of New York. 
While they could not seek redress in court, the Six Nations vigorously 
protested the loss of their lands in public and legislative fora, negating any 
suggestion that they acquiesced in the illegal takings. Nonetheless, in City 
of Sherrill, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Oneidas’ “long delay in 
seeking relief” against New York and decades of development of the land 
justified application of the equitable doctrines of “laches, acquiescence and 
impossibility” to preclude relief.
103
 Centuries of history contradict that 
conclusion. If equitable considerations are to be dispositive in resolving Six 
Nations’ land claims, any fair balancing of equities must take into account 
the documented fact of the Six Nations’ historical efforts, against enormous 
obstacles, to obtain justice. A permanent resolution of the Six Nations’ land 
claims will not be possible without fidelity to even-handed and accurate 
history. 
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